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Abstract As the world population is growing and government directives tell us to
consume more fatty acids, the demand for fish is increasing. Due to declines in wild
fish populations, we have come to rely more and more on aquaculture. Despite rapid
expansion of aquaculture, this sector is still in a relatively early developmental
stage. This means that this sector can still be steered in a favorable direction, which
requires discussion about sustainability. If we want to avoid similar problems to the
ones we have experienced with livestock farming, we need to generate knowledge
of the biology, profitability, environmental aspects, consumer awareness, and
product appreciation of particular fish species. However, the discussion about a
sustainable aquaculture also raises the question how we should treat fish. This moral
question is regularly addressed as a problem of applied ethics with a focus on
tailoring ethical principles to practical questions. In this article we do not deny the
importance of the practical accounts, but we start from the fundamental question
whether and why fish matter in our moral deliberations, i.e., from the discussion on
moral status. We elaborate the distinction between moral considerability and moral
significance in order to show both the importance and the limitations of the dis-
cussion about moral status for practical problems in aquaculture. We illustrate these
points with a case-study about the farming of a specific fish species, the African
catfish.
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Introduction
As the world population is growing, we face an increasing demand for animal
protein, including fish.1 Government directives to increase the intake of omega 3
fatty acids by consuming more fish also play a role in the growing demand for fish.
For example, the Dutch Health Council advises the consumption of fish twice a
week, of which at least once fatty fish, in order to achieve an intake of 450 mg of
omega 3 fatty acids per day (Gezondheidsraad 2006).2 At the same time, we are
experiencing global declines of wild fish populations. This raises concerns about the
sustainability of the fishing industry and causes us to rely more and more on farmed
fish. Due to these developments, aquaculture has become the fastest growing animal
production sector in the world. In 2007, 43% of human consumption of fish was
supplied by aquaculture, and these numbers appear to be increasing (Bostock et al.
2010). While the aquaculture sector is growing rapidly, compared to land animal
husbandry, it is still in an early developmental stage. At this stage the sector can still
be steered in a favorable direction, regarding social and environmental sustainabil-
ity, including global food security, and concerns for animal welfare. At the same
time, the aquaculture sector has reached a dimension where it needs to become more
professional and where regulation can still be influenced. These crossroads at which
the sector finds itself, of early development and a possibility to influence regulation,
yet rapid expansion, shows that we are in need of a discussion about aquaculture
and, moreover, that this is the right time to have this discussion.
In order for aquaculture to become environmentally and socially sustainable,
knowledge needs to be generated of the biology, profitability, environmental
aspects, consumer awareness, and product appreciation (Leun et al. 2007).
However, the discussion about sustainable aquaculture also raises the question of
how we should treat fish. Asking this question implies that the interests of fish
matter from a moral perspective. At the moment, the question of how we should
treat fish tends to be understood primarily as an applied ethical question, in which
ethical tools or moral guiding principles are sought in order to reach a practical
solution for welfare and environmental problems (Grigorakis 2010; Bergqvist and
Gunnarsson 2011; Millar and Tomkins 2007). While this is surely relevant, such
solutions presuppose answers on a more fundamental level, at least if one wants to
reach legitimate moral statements. This requires an analysis of moral status. With
the help of, for example, the ethical matrix, but also other applied ethics accounts, a
leap is made to a practice that in our eyes cannot be made yet.3 This leap is too hasty
for two reasons: firstly, it is necessary to make more fundamental presupposi-
tions explicit, and secondly, regarding the capacities of fish we still encounter a
1 Of course, a growing demand for fish does not imply there is also a growing need for it, as many good
alternatives to animal protein can be found.
2 This directive is contested, however. Some argue that the benefits of omega 3 are overstated or that
there are many plant-based sources of omega 3, such as walnuts, seaweed, algae, soybean oil, and linseed
oil. See Willett (2008) and Milovanovic and Radovic (2008).
3 The ethical matrix is a discussion and decision-making tool for ethical questions, in which a matrix is
used with the groups that are involved along one axis and moral principles (such as autonomy, justice, and
beneficence) along the other axis. See Mepham (2005) and http:\\www.ethicalmatrix.net.
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knowledge gap and many uncertainties. Before addressing applied questions of
sustainable aquaculture or welfare friendly housing systems it is necessary to deal
with a number of more fundamental questions. The first one is ‘‘why do fish matter
morally?’’ There is a profound plurality of answers to this question. This is related
to the discussion on the moral status of fish. An analysis of the notion of moral
status and theories of moral status is essential in order to come to practical answers
for the problems of aquaculture. However, attributing moral status to fish does not
directly lead to action guiding moral principles.
This leads to the second question: how should we treat animals that matter
morally? To get a grip on the discussion on moral status we use the distinction
between moral considerability and moral significance. Most mainstream theories of
moral status agree that at least certain animals matter morally, or in other words, are
morally considerable. This is based on certain morally relevant facts about these
animals. However, when we want to determine how much animals matter, in other
words, how morally significant they are, it becomes more difficult—particularly in
the case of fish. At this point the lack of morally relevant information becomes more
problematic. Moreover, we will argue that this lack of information causes more of a
problem for some moral theories than for others. The different normative starting
points of different moral theories can lead to conflicts in practice. For example,
conflicts about the questions whether we are allowed to kill fish or what housing
systems are allowed.
A third step is to address the question of how we should deal with conflicting
moral duties regarding animals. A theory of moral status does not yet tell us how we
should weigh different duties in practice. This requires a normative theory. This is to
say that when we encounter practical questions about how to treat fish in
aquaculture we need to realize that we cannot find answers without adopting a
specific moral framework. When we make a decision in a conflict situation we
implicitly makes choices regarding moral considerability and moral significance.
In this article we want to show, based on these three questions, both the
importance and the limitations of a discussion on moral status for practical problems
in aquaculture. We will illustrate these points with the help of a case-study about the
farming of the African catfish. In the next section we will briefly introduce this case-
study and we will come back to it later in the article. After the introduction of the
case-study we will clarify the concept of moral status. Then we will discuss theories
in animal ethics in order to show the theory-dependency of thinking about the
treatment of fish, and draw our conclusions.
Case-Study: The African Catfish
The claims we want to make in this article about moral status are applicable to other
animals as well, but we want to focus on fish here. These animals form a very
interesting research subject for ethics, because they present a borderline case. It is
difficult to establish whether fish have awareness and can suffer. We cannot read
their facial expressions or hear their cries. They are anatomically similar to us in
some respects but very different in others; they have a different brain structure to
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mammals, for example. Fish are also interesting because there are so many different
species and there is so much variation between species. Different species have
different capabilities and this raises the question of whether duties to fish may vary
by species. We cannot make sweeping statements about all fish in general and
therefore we will, at least primarily, focus research on one particular species.
Our research is about the moral status of the African catfish (Clarias gariepinus)
and is part of a larger research project about the welfare of this fish in aquaculture
and the sustainability of this type of aquaculture. Our research group consists of
physiologists, ethicists, and animal welfare specialists who study different aspects
of the farming of the African catfish, such as the questions of how to decrease
transportation stress and how to kill the animals as humanely as possible. We have
chosen to study the African catfish as this is potentially a new favorite species in
European aquaculture, due to its sturdiness, formidable growth, and efficient food-
conversion ratio. As we described in the introduction regarding aquaculture
in general, the catfish sector is still in a relatively early developmental stage, but
is growing. Dutch Clarias production in 2007 was 4,200 ton and is increasing
(Eijk 2008). As for a lot of new aquaculture species in countries that do not have a
history in aquaculture, we see that a defined regulatory framework is lacking in the
catfish sector in the Netherlands.
We can note some similarities and differences with other animal husbandry
practices. In contrast to most other farmed animals, the African catfish can deal well
with crowding, at least for a limited period of time. This is due to the environmental
circumstances in which this species evolved: the fish have to be able to survive in
very dry conditions and they manage this by lying on top of one another until the
onset of the wet season. Furthermore, the African catfish is held in closed
recirculation systems, which means that we do not encounter the same environ-
mental problems as in other aquaculture systems, such as pollution, habitat
destruction, and pathogen spreading. Finally, the catfish has a better food conversion
ratio than other farmed fish, such as salmon. Like many other farmed fish, on the
other hand, Clarias is piscivorous and it is fed wild fish, which contributes to
overfishing. While not much is known yet about the specific features of this fish
species, it is established that it is naturally aggressive (Martins et al. 2005;
Nieuwegiessen 2009). It appears that this aggression is exacerbated by farming
conditions. Increased aggression could be interpreted as the result of stress.
Moreover, it appears that this aggression has negative consequences for welfare.
Like in other animal husbandry practices, we therefore encounter welfare problems
with the farming of the African catfish, for example during handling and transport.
Even though the fish appear to be able to cope well with handling, common
practices place so much stress on them that some do not survive transport. These
observations raise the question as to how we should treat the African catfish. The
standard reaction to these sorts of problems in animal husbandry is to attempt to
change this practice with regards to sustainability and welfare. This also appears to
be the assumption underlying our own research, which focuses on the questions of
how the fish can be transported, kept, and slaughtered in a more welfare-friendly
manner. However, these applied questions cannot be fully answered before we have
addressed more fundamental issues of moral status and ethical theory. The first
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question that needs to be answered is why fish matter morally. We will analyze this
question below.
Moral Status
Moral status is commonly conceived of in the following way: all beings that possess
moral status are members of the moral community and their interests should be
taken into account in our moral decisions. Understood in this sense, moral status
does not seem to admit gradations. After all, one either is or is not a member of the
moral community; one cannot be a little bit of a member. However, one could also
understand the meaning of the concept of moral status in a different sense. One
could ask ‘‘what is the moral status of this particular animal?’’ The answer could not
only be ‘‘the moral status of this animal is that it belongs (or does not belong) to the
moral community,’’ but it could also be ‘‘the moral status of animal x is higher than
that of animal y.’’ In other words, framing the concept of moral status in this way
presupposes that there are levels of moral status, and hence that gradation is
possible. While moral status in the first use of the concept does not specify to what
extent a being’s interests should be taken into account, in the second use a basis for
the weighing of interests is already made. The second use not only specifies what
entities belong to the moral community, but also to what extent their interests count.
In order to avoid confusion, we think it is best to go along with those ethicists who
make a distinction between moral considerability and moral significance and regard
moral status as encompassing both (Gruen 2010; Goodpaster 1978). In Gruen’s
words:
To say that a being deserves moral consideration is to say that there is a moral
claim that this being has on those who can recognize such claims. A morally
considerable being is a being who can be wronged in a morally relevant sense
(Gruen 2010, np).
In other words, moral considerability gives a being an entry ticket to the moral
community. However, Gruen (2010 np) continues,
that non-human animals can make moral claims on us does not in itself
indicate how such claims are to be assessed and conflicting claims adjudicated.
Being morally considerable is like showing up on a moral radar screen—how
strong the signal is or where it is located on the screen are separate questions.
Staying with this metaphor, we could say that the answer to the questions
whether an animal should matter morally, and why, determines its showing up on a
moral radar screen (considerability). The answer to the question how we should
treat the animal is dependent on how strong the signal is and where it is located on
the screen (significance). Determination of an animal’s moral significance sheds
light on the question of how we should treat an animal in a particular situation, but it
does not fully determine this treatment. This is because, besides moral significance,
more considerations may enter into our decision making process. What consider-
ations these are will depend on one’s normative theory. An example could be that if
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we have made a commitment to one animal but not another—for example because
the first animal is our pet and the second is not—we have more duties towards the
first animal, even though both animals might have the same moral considerability
and same moral significance. In order to know how we should adjudicate in conflicts
of interest we need more input than just a position on moral considerability and
significance.
Even though they are related and in practice it is often difficult to separate these
categories, it is important to make the distinction between considerability,
significance, and the adjudication of conflict. An answer to the first does not lead
to an unequivocal answer to the second or third. Even if two animal ethicists were to
grant moral status to an animal on the same basis, say the fact that the animal can
suffer, they could still reach different conclusions about how to treat the animal,
because their argumentation is derived from different normative theories. So, for
example, if two animal ethicists were to argue that African catfish are members of
the moral community because they have the ability to feel pain, for one this can
mean that we can genetically modify the catfish in order to grow better, as long as
this does not cause welfare problems, while for the other this can mean that we
cannot modify them, because this would not show the fish proper respect. In other
words, it is possible for ethicists to take a characteristic, such as sentience, as basis
for moral considerability without taking sentience as the most important criterion in
their theory of action.
An example can show the relevance of the distinction between considerability and
significance and the role that normative theory plays in theories of moral status. Like
already alluded to above, a question that is discussed among animal ethicists is
whether moral status admits degrees. DeGrazia (2008) argues that it does, because
morally relevant characteristics come in degrees, but his account is criticized by
Visak (2010). According to DeGrazia (2008, p. 192), reasons to grant two beings
with a comparable interest different moral significance, could be that one has a higher
degree of ‘‘cognitive, affective, and social complexity.’’ Visak points out that these
properties are irrelevant when we are talking about comparable interests: if we are
dealing with a dilemma in which an interest in not suffering is at stake, all we should
do is compare amounts of suffering. As long as one can suffer one has an interest in
not suffering and this interest does not change when other characteristics (such as
rationality) of the entity are present or absent. These can be affected by cognitive,
affective, and social complexity, but then the interests would not be comparable
anymore and this still would not mean that the moral status of these beings is
different. DeGrazia, however, appears to say that due to differences in cognitive,
affective, and social complexity, the interests of beings with lower complexity
cannot even be compared to the interests of beings with a higher complexity. For
him, therefore, while it is sufficient that a being has interests—for which ability to
suffer suffices—in order to be morally considerable, the being’s moral significance is
based on other properties of the being, such as cognitive complexity. DeGrazia, then,
appears to define moral status in the encompassing sense, including considerability
and significance, and as gradations are possible in significance, it appears that
considerability also admits gradations. Visak takes issue with the idea that moral
status admits gradations, because she takes moral status more strictly to mean moral
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considerability. This point of view on moral status is directly informed by her start in
utilitarianism, and thus in the imperative that moral decisions should be made by
weighing different interests and choosing the course of action that maximizes those
interests (Visak 2011). So while all animals are equally morally considerable, how
significant they (or rather, their interests) are, is dependent on the overall scheme of
things and not on some property of the animal in question.
The discussion between the two authors shows, first of all, that whether one frames
moral status as admitting degrees depends on whether one deems only one property
sufficient to establish moral considerability and significance, or whether one takes a
multi-property approach, in which one property establishes moral considerability,
but other properties determine moral significance. Even if one disagrees—as some
philosophers do4—that there is a different answer to the questions ‘‘what beings
matter morally?’’ and ‘‘how much do their interests weigh?’’, it is still important to
acknowledge that these are two different questions and to make explicit why the
answer to the two questions is the same. Secondly, this discussion shows that moral
status is not a morally neutral concept, because whether one takes considerability and
significance to coincide or not depends upon one’s normative theoretical framework.
The upshot of this discussion is that if one wants to understand the discussion about
the moral treatment of animals it does not help to simply make a deeper conceptual
analysis of the concept of moral status, but that one will also have to look at
normative theory. This is what we will do in the next section.
Theories in Animal Ethics: Intrinsic Properties
Ethicists with different theoretical backgrounds justify moral considerability and
significance of animals on different grounds; there is no theory-neutral basis for
moral status. Within the analytical tradition, four main lines of justification can be
found: an utilitarian, a deontological, a relation or care- ethical line, and a virtue-
ethical line. The strategy used in most argumentation lines in animal ethics is to say
that moral status depends on the possession of a certain property or group of
properties. These could be either intrinsic or extrinsic properties. Intrinsic properties
are properties of the animal in question. Candidates are, for example, sentience or
capacity to suffer, conscious experience, the possession of desires, self-reflective
agency, or autonomous activity. Extrinsic ‘‘properties’’5 refer to relationships
between the entity and its surroundings (for example, its place in an ecosystem) or
between the entity and moral agents (in particular humans). Both utilitarian and
deontological theories focus on intrinsic properties.
So how do utilitarians and deontologists answer our three questions of (1)
whether animals are morally considerable, (2) how morally significant they are (and
whether there is a difference between these two concepts), and (3) how we should
4 For example Taylor (1986) and, as we shall see, Regan (1983).
5 Of course, one can wonder whether in the case of relationships it is appropriate to speak of ‘‘properties’’
of an individual in the first place; perhaps the extrinsic account is more about an individual’s ‘‘position’’
than about its properties. We would like to thank Sjaak Swart for pointing this out.
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weigh their interests in cases of conflict? In the utilitarian view of Singer (1975),
entities deserve moral considerability because, and in as far as, they have the ability
to feel pain and pleasure. In other words, sentience is a necessary and sufficient
criterion for moral considerability. This is because for Singer what matters in
morality are interests; his theory starts from the basic principle that equal interests
should be treated equally. A being that is not sentient, such as a rock, does not have
an interest in not being kicked, while a sentient being, such as a mouse, does have an
interest in not being used as a soccer ball. In the deontological view of Tom Regan,
entities deserve moral status if they are subjects-of-a-life, which could be taken to
mean that they can experience their life subjectively. In order to experience ones’
life as a subject of it, one needs certain characteristics, which include sentience, but
also self-awareness. Regan, therefore, places stronger demands on entities’
characteristics that confer moral considerability than Singer; for him it is not just
about the capacity to feel pain and pleasure, but also about certain cognitive
capacities, such as having desires, beliefs, a memory, a sense of the future, a
psychosocial identity over time, and being able to act intentionally (Regan 2003,
p. 18). In other words, for Singer sentience is a sufficient criterion for moral status,
but for Regan it is a necessary, but not sufficient criterion. The reason why Singer
and Regan focus on these specific characteristics is influenced by their broader
normative framework. Regan focuses on cognitive capacities because he is a
deontologist who follows Kant, and Kant focused on autonomy. Singer focuses on
suffering, because he is an utilitarian and utilitarians aim to promote a non-moral
value, such as happiness or the absence of suffering. Their view on what ethics aims
at, therefore, prestructures their thinking about moral status. Also, in both theories
the concept of interests is very basic and this is already a non-neutral starting-point.
When answering the second question, about moral significance, it is even more
obvious how normative theory comes in. Utilitarians argue that we should achieve
the best possible balance of happiness, well-being, or some other intrinsic value,
over unhappiness or suffering, for all those affected by our moral decision. The
specific version of utilitarianism that Singer supports is preference utilitarianism,
meaning that we have an obligation to weigh the preferences of different entities
against one another. This means, amongst other things, that all those beings that
have a preference for staying alive have an interest in not being killed, and this
interest should be taken seriously.6 Beings with a concept of themselves as beings
with a future possess self-consciousness and can form a preference to stay alive.
Beings who lack this capacity, but that can still suffer, merely possess consciousness
(Palmer 2003). The latter can be painlessly killed and replaced.7 While for Singer,
then, sentience is a sufficient criterion for moral considerability, the moral
significance of an entity is influenced by more than just the capability to suffer pain
and enjoy pleasure; it is influenced by cognitive complexity. Moreover, in practice
the interests of self-conscious animals often carry more weight in moral decisions
because their suffering is often greater, as they can fear the future or have painful
6 Still, this is not an absolute prohibition on killing or harming a being, because if total utility would be
served by killing a person, this could, at least in theory, be permitted in utilitarianism.
7 For a thorough discussion and critique of this ‘‘replaceability argument’’ see Visak (2011).
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memories. The significance question, then, is decided by his normative ethical
theory and not by his ‘‘moral considerability theory.’’
For Regan, all those beings that are subjects-of-a-life have inherent value and we
should treat them with respect for this value; this means, amongst other things, that
we should not use them as mere instruments or means, but also as ends in
themselves; a view that is clearly based on Kant. This principle of respect for
inherent value is absolute, as inherent value does not admit degrees. For Regan,
therefore, the answer to the questions ‘‘what beings matter morally?’’ and ‘‘how
much do their interests weigh?’’ is the same: all beings that matter morally matter
equally. In other words, for Regan, significance and considerability—at least in
theory—coincide. He already takes some degree of self-awareness as important for
the question of which beings are morally considerable, while for Singer self-
awareness only becomes relevant when discussing moral significance. For both
philosophers, interests are fundamental and both use intrinsic properties to
determine whether a being is morally considerable. Nevertheless, both give
different answers to the moral significance question. Significance in Singer’s
account is dependent on the overall good of everyone involved, whereas for Regan
it is something that attaches to the individual. For Singer it is about maximizing
preferences, whereas for Regan it is about not treating those with inherent value as
mere instruments. This means that in certain cases they judge differently; for
example, if an animal is genetically modified this in itself is not problematic for
Singer, assuming that it does not interfere with the animal’s well-being and that the
animal does not have a preference not to be modified. However, Regan would be
opposed to genetically modifying an animal that possesses inherent value, because it
would treat the animal merely as a means and not as an end in itself.
When we look at the third question, namely ‘‘how should we adjudicate in
conflict situations?’’, we see that normative theory frames the answer again. In fact,
it even seems to frame the question. For Singer the questions of how to treat an
animal and how to arbitrate in case of a conflict of interest are in effect the same, as
both depend on the overall calculation of preference maximization. For Regan the
questions how to treat an animal and how to deal with conflicts of interest are
different. How, then, does Regan consider that we ought to make decisions in the
face of conflicts of interest? He introduces the notion of ‘‘comparable harm,’’ which
is a situation when the well-being of two or more beings stands to be equally
violated. When we have to choose between the interests of two groups with
comparable harm, we should choose to harm the group with the lower number of
individuals (the so-called ‘‘miniride principle’’). This is in line with the absolute
nature of inherent value, because it is worse to override rights many times than a
few times. However, when the harms involved are not comparable we are justified
in overriding the rights of many if overriding the rights of a few would make them
worse-off than any of the many would be if the former option were chosen (the
so-called ‘‘worse-off principle’’). This last principle is where Regan clearly departs
from utilitarianism, because it in effect means that no individual may be sacrificed
for the good of the whole if this would greatly disadvantage her vis-a`-vis the rest. In
general, according to this principle, all subjects-of-a-life are still treated with equal
respect for their inherent value. However, in some cases Regan argues that we can
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justify differential treatment of beings with equal inherent value on the basis of the
worse-off principle. Imagine a shipwreck in which five survive, four humans and a
dog. Only four fit into the lifeboat and they have to throw one overboard or else all
die. In this case, according to Regan, our intuition that the dog should be thrown
overboard is warranted. This is based on the idea that the harms involved are not
comparable; the harm of death is worse for humans than for dogs, as the former
generally have more complex interests due to their higher psychosocial capacities.
To sum up, for Regan all beings with inherent value have equal inherent value and
we should treat them with respect for this inherent value. Still, when it comes to the
question of how to deal with conflicts of interest, Regan leaves his categorical
principle and argues that there are reasons to treat different beings differently. This
shows that, though related, the questions of how animals should be treated and how
to deal with conflicts of interest can generate different answers, and should—at least
analytically—be separated.
Theories in Animal Ethics: Extrinsic Properties
We will now briefly go into relational and virtue ethical accounts in order to show
that here as well theories about the moral treatment of animals and normative
theories are interconnected. This will show, again, that there is no theory-neutral
standpoint from which to regard moral status and, in other words, that normative
theory prestructures our thinking about moral status. In fact, we will show that
different ethical theoretical perspectives even frame the question of how we should
deal with animals differently; these approaches take a different question as a starting
point.
Relational ethics does not focus on intrinsic properties that confer moral status.
Relational or care-ethical views in animal ethics suggest that we have obligations
towards animals because we are in a specific relationship to them. This means that
we have different obligations to different types of animal. We have more
responsibility towards a farm- or a laboratory animal than towards an animal in the
wild, for example. While we have positive duties towards the former, we only have
negative duties towards the latter. We have more responsibilities towards animals in
our care, because we have made prior commitments to them, by domesticating
them, for example. According to relational ethics, rational argumentation, like that
of Regan and Singer, overlooks the centrality of feelings of sympathy or empathy
that we can have towards animals. It is through these feelings that people come to
change their behavior, and not solely through rational argument (Gruen 2010).
Now what can we say about moral status in relational or care-ethical theories?
The relational account seems to already assume that animals are morally
considerable and focuses more on the significance question. In other words, their
departure question is different than those of intrinsic accounts. We would not
readily formulate an argument for moral considerability in terms of relationships;
rather it seems that through our relationships with animals we come to appreciate
that these animals matter, perhaps in a reflective way, but not necessarily by
rationally arguing that certain properties lead to moral considerability. An argument
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for moral significance can be formulated in terms of relationships, however. Care
ethicists often use terms such as responsibility, dependence, and vulnerability in
order to determine how we should treat others. For example, if a human (for
example a baby) or animal (for example a laboratory animal) is particularly
vulnerable this would make a stronger appeal on our responsibilities. Relational
ethics can come across as counter-intuitive, because every animal is an individual
and why would it matter what the relationship of the animal is to a human being?
A mouse is a mouse, regardless of whether it is a laboratory animal, a pet, or
‘‘vermin.’’ From the internal standpoint of the animal it does not matter what sort of
obligations humans have in a specific context, it just matters to it that it is treated
well or that it is not killed. On the other hand, from the perspective of the person
making a moral assessment it does matter (for example, it matters for one’s decision
whether to help a being if one was responsible for injuring that being). So for
determining one’s duty it may differ whether a mouse that is ill is one’s pet or just a
mouse one encountered in the pantry. This shows that in relational ethics
relationships also come in when we ask the third question of how to deal with
conflicting interests.
Our point is not to argue that relational ethics is a more promising avenue for
conferring moral status, but that moral considerability is not so important in this
theory; relational ethics simply asks a different question. Relational ethicists are not
so concerned with arguing coherently for the moral considerability of certain
entities, but rather, they are more concerned with explaining what motivates humans
to treat animals in a certain way. The view about what ethical theory is already
differs between Singer and Regan on the one hand and relational ethics on the other;
or more generally, between intrinsic and extrinsic accounts. While the first argue
from a universalistic view on ethics–meaning that if there are no biological or
psychological differences we cannot make a moral distinction between entities–
relational ethics sees moral theory not as universal, but as fundamentally context
related (Swart 2006).
Similarly, virtue ethics is not universalistic, but more contextualist. Like
relational ethicists, virtue ethicists are not so interested in the moral status question.
They also reject the emphasis on rational argumentation of theories like Singer and
Regan’s and they simply view animals as members of our community. As Gruen
(2010, np) explains, animals are members of our community that ‘‘pull on us and it
is in virtue of this indescribable pull that we recognize what is wrong with cruelty.
Animals are individuals with whom we share a common life and this recognition
allows us to see them as they are.’’ If we treat animals badly, we are displaying the
wrong character traits. Virtuous character traits are, for example, sensitivity and
compassion and we do not cultivate these traits when we routinely harm animals.
However, this view begs the question as to what treating animals badly actually
means and why this would reflect badly on our character. It just assumes that
animals are part of our moral community, but it does not draw a clear demarcation
line. Does the same hold for plants, for example? It appears that virtue ethicists are
simply asking a different question than philosophers like Singer or Regan. They are
not concerned with the question of why certain entities belong to the moral
community and others do not. Rather, they are more concerned with establishing the
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correct attitude of moral actors towards morally considerable beings. By empha-
sizing virtues and morally desirable characteristics, they can only say something
about moral considerability to a limited extent and even less about moral
significance. In fact, one can wonder if they are even concerned with the moral
status-question at all.
Implications for Fish
When we relate the foregoing expose´ about intrinsic and extrinsic property accounts
to our case-study of the African catfish (and to fish in general), what can we say?
First, do these fish have moral status, defined in terms of being morally
considerable? As we saw, for Singer only sentience counts for moral considera-
bility, while Regan also demands more complex cognitive capacities. The research
by the physiologists in our group is relevant for the intrinsic properties approach in
animal ethics, because it will provide an insight into the characteristics of these
animals and might give us some insight into their interests. Initial results show that
increased levels of cortisol can be measured in African catfish, for instance after
transport, pointing to the presence of stress.8 However, the questions whether
African catfish experience pain and have more complex cognitive capacities, are
more difficult to answer.
Let us have a look at pain, for example. We can distinguish between two different
phases of pain. There is an unconscious phase where the nervous system
automatically responds to whatever is damaging an entity: This is called nociception
(DeGrazia 1996). It has been established that many fish have a nervous system and
have nociceptors (Braithwaite 2010). Nociceptors send a signal to the spinal cord
and this causes an immediate reflex response. Only in the second phase, when the
spine sends a signal to the brain, one consciously experiences the pain (Braithwaite
2010). The question that is debated is whether the second phase occurs in fish
(Braithwaite 2010; Rose 2002). The moral considerability question, therefore,
demands scientific insight into nociception as well as scientific research to find out
how conscious fish are.
Some raise doubts about the idea that fish can experience pain. This is because
fish cannot tell us that they are in pain, we cannot hear them scream, and it is hard to
read their facial expressions, and we therefore have to devise tests to find out. But
the design of these tests and the interpretation of the test results can be called into
question. For example, in choice-experiments animals are given a choice of two
options one of which they have to work harder for. If they are prepared to do the
work, it is assumed that they prefer a certain situation, for example because it is less
painful. However, skeptics argue that from the behavior of animals that is classified
as pain behavior we cannot automatically infer that animals subjectively experience
pain. Bermond (1997), for example, cites evidence of human patients with spinal
cord lesions who showed pain behavior but reported not feeling any pain. Of
course, the question is what can be inferred from this evidence. It shows that in
8 Personal communication with Remy Manuel and Jeroen Boerrigter.
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extraordinary circumstances pain behavior and pain perception can be separated, but
does it tell us something about the normal state of affairs regarding pain perception?
Whether these assumptions and interpretations of ethologists are indeed question-
able is a matter for philosophical reflection, particularly in the field of the
philosophy of mind. The attribution of moral considerability to fish on the basis that
they can suffer, therefore, is not self-evident and while scientific input is necessary
for this, it alone cannot settle the matter. Certain philosophical interpretations are
also necessary to make the step from nociception to awareness of pain.
Despite the doubts raised by some, the general consensus among fish researchers
appears to be that fish do experience pain (Braithwaite 2010; Roques et al. 2010;
van de Vis et al. 2003). Yet, among the animal ethicists who write about fish
disagreement reigns. Singer (1975, pp. 171–174), for example, has argued that we
should take the interests of fish into account and DeGrazia (1999, p. 29) assumes
that fish are sentient and thus morally considerable, albeit less significant than
humans, because they are ‘‘cognitively extremely primitive in comparison with
humans.’’ Gary Varner, on the other hand, has argued that beings that have interests
are morally considerable and in order to have interests one needs to have desires. He
cites research that shows that there is some evidence for holding that reptiles and
amphibians have desires, stronger evidence that birds are capable of having desires
and even stronger that shows that mammals have desires, while the evidence for
desires in fish is rather weak (Varner 1998, chapter 2). Similarly, Regan (1983,
p. 29) does not appear to include fish into the moral community, as he defines the
range of subjects-of-a-life as ‘‘normal mammals over one year old.’’ Regan seems to
presuppose that fish do not have the qualities necessary to be a subject-of-a-life, yet
he is willing to change the scope of the moral community when empirical research
shows us otherwise.
However, if it is already difficult to establish whether fish feel pain, it is even
harder to establish whether they possess the cognitive capacities required by Regan
and Varner. Tests are being done to establish, for example, how much memory
certain fish have. As fish are anatomically quite different from us, it takes a lot of
imagination to devise tests to establish whether fish can act intentionally or have a
sense of the future. Along the way certain interpretations have to be made, that are
often not value-neutral. While we need empirical research to show us whether the
animals experience pain or stress or have other cognitive capacities, we, therefore,
need to bear in mind that test results still need to be interpreted. In fact, these
capacities only get their meaning and value the moment they are judged from the
standpoint of a specific normative theoretical framework. Moreover, if we want to
establish not only moral considerability, but also significance on the basis of
intrinsic properties, we need to have some way of comparing pain levels and
cognitive capacities of fish, which is no small feat. One could imagine that even
more value assumptions come in when we make such comparisons. While
establishing moral significance for mammals is already difficult, in the case of fish
we simply lack morally relevant facts. Empirical research primarily focuses on pain
perception and some cognitive characteristics, such as presence of memory and
preferences, but not much is known yet about higher cognitive capacities in fish.
Conditioning experiments carried out in the research of the physiologists in our
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group only makes a start with this difficult but important question. One major
problem is that the central nervous system, including the brain, of fish is so different
from that of mammals. This could mean either that fish lack higher cognitive
capacities, because they do not have the brain structures that account for these
capacities in humans, or that they express similar functions in different parts of the
brain.9
What are the implications of our knowledge deficit about fish cognition for
theories of moral status? These implications will differ for different moral theories.
Utilitarians would argue that we should not harm the welfare of fish, because the
pleasure humans get from the taste of fish does not weigh up to the harm that is done
to fish in aquaculture. So the knowledge deficit is not a problem for a utilitarian in
the sense that it does not change the utilitarian view on moral considerability and it
gives us an indication for how to adjudicate in conflicts that involve harm to fish
welfare. However, the knowledge deficit has consequences for preference utilitar-
ians regarding the moral significance question. If it is unclear what the cognitive
abilities of fish are, it is hard to establish whether they have preferences, in
particular the preference to stay alive. Preference utilitarians can therefore not take a
stance on the question whether it is problematic to painlessly kill fish if they have
had an otherwise pleasant life. The physiologists in our group have only just made a
start to establish catfish preferences, by teaching them to press different pendulums
for different types of food. A lot more work needs to be done before the significance
question can be dealt with satisfactorily. For deontologists the knowledge deficit is
already problematic on the level of moral considerability, but is even more
problematic when weighing interests of humans against animals, as this is based to
an even greater extent on knowledge about cognitive complexity.
Another problem for both utilitarians and deontologists arises when they need to
give content to the concept of welfare. On the basis of their theories of moral status
we might say that we need to take the welfare of animals into account, but what
does this mean exactly in the case of fish? If we do not have much information about
the preferences and level of consciousness of fish, it will be hard to give content to
the concept of fish welfare. Animal welfare can refer to different situations. For
example, it can refer simply to the absence of suffering, but it can also refer to the
presence of positive experiences or to the ability of an animal to display its natural
behavior. The choices one makes regarding the concept of welfare will be
determined by the normative assumptions of one’s theoretical framework. In case
one interprets welfare as primarily the absence of suffering more can be said on the
basis of empirical research than when one has a more demanding interpretation of
welfare.
9 There is evidence that shows that certain birds, in particular jays and crows, have complex cognition
even though they lack a prefrontal cortex, which is the part of the brain that is linked to higher cognitive
functions in humans and apes. In the brains of jays and crows these ‘‘prefrontal’’ functions can be found in
the part that is analogous to the cortex, the mesopallium and the nidopallium. It appears that prefrontal
function has been developed through convergent evolution in jays and crows. See Emery and Clayton
(2004) and Fonken et al. (under review). It is possible, at least theoretically, that a similar process of
convergent evolution has taken place in some fish species.
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What are the implications of our research into the African catfish for extrinsic
property accounts? For these accounts establishing sentience and cognition in fish is
not so important, as moral considerability is ‘‘acknowledged’’ or ‘‘recognized’’
rather than argued for on the basis of empirical evidence. However, for these
approaches we need scientific research as well, for example to find out how the
animals react to farmers and handlers. After all, these could show to what extent the
animals make an appeal on us. Also, research is needed to establish whether fish can
have meaningful relationships with humans. Finally, sociological research may be
relevant to find out how people in close contact to the animals perceive them and to
understand what they would consider virtuous behavior towards them.
Normative and Conceptual Choices
So far, it has become clear that there is no theory-neutral standpoint from which to
discuss moral status. In fact, the moral landscape of the different approaches
outlined above is so different that they even ask different questions about animals. If
we look at our first question, whether animals are morally considerable, some
ethicists start with the question whether animals have interests, while others
emphasize our commitments towards animals as arising from our relationships or
our virtues. Relational and virtue ethical approaches tend to have a richer moral
terminology than rationalistic approaches; they do not only focus on what is our
duty or obligation, but also on what is allowed or permitted and what is the proper
attitude to display.10 The answers to the questions of what an animal’s moral
significance is and how we should adjudicate in cases of conflict are also dependent
on one’s normative ethical framework. For some (such as Singer) these questions
overlap, while for others these are two independent questions. Of course, how one
argues for moral considerability of animals will influence one’s view on their moral
significance, and moral significance will inform how we adjudicate conflicts, but it
is conceivable that two theories use the same criterion for establishing moral
considerability—say sentience—but have different views on moral significance and
adjudication, because the latter is dependent on their normative ethical theories.
The upshot of this discussion is that the moral status question on its own is not
that informative in a practical context. There does not even seem to be one moral
status question that all theories ask. A view on moral status tells us whose interests
we should take into account, and perhaps even how much those interests should
weigh in theory, but it does not help us make decisions in concrete cases or justify
particular decisions. In order to make practical decisions we need to look at the
specific context in which we find ourselves and different considerations will play a
role. For practical decisions, then, we need to rely to an even greater extent on a
normative theory of action. If animal ethics wants to be able to provide tools that
can be used in practice, where people are concerned with how to behave towards
10 Besides these four approaches, there are also multi-criterial approaches to moral status, such as that of
Warren (2000) that argue that there is more than one criterion that is valid for attributing moral status, that
there are different types of moral obligations, and that both intrinsic and extrinsic properties play a role.
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animals, then more ethical work needs to be done on the moral significance and the
adjudication questions. To this end the conceptual and normative assumptions of
different theoretical approaches to moral significance and adjudication will need to
be made more explicit.
Moreover, as has become clear in the foregoing, ethicists need to work more
closely together with empirical scientists. Judgments about the moral status of fish
are still tentative, because at this stage we simply lack many morally relevant facts.
The lack of knowledge, particularly regarding cognitive capacities of fish, is more
problematic within some theoretical perspectives and regarding some questions than
others. It is less problematic for utilitarians in as far as they focus on sentience.
However, when utilitarians want to make statements about fish welfare or when they
want to decide whether the killing of fish is problematic they need to resort to
information about cognitive capacities of fish that is to a large extent still lacking.
For deontologists the knowledge gap is problematic in as far as the moral
considerability question is still inconclusive and when decisions need to be made in
cases of conflict. In general it could be said that the knowledge gap poses more
problems for establishing moral significance than for moral considerability, and
arguably even more problems when we need to resolve conflicts in practice.
Extrinsic property accounts are dealing with a knowledge gap that is different in
kind. While they rely to a lesser extent on empirical information about the capacities
of fish they need information about the behavior of fish, about human-fish
interactions, and sociological information about attitudes towards fish. This poses a
problem for them, for example because saying that we have more duties towards
fish in our care does not specify yet what the content of those duties are. Ultimately
this also presupposes empirical knowledge about fish welfare or interests.
Conclusion
As aquaculture is still in an early developmental stage, but at the same time we are
dealing with a sector that is growing rapidly, we have reached a point where
discussion about sustainability and fish welfare is both timely and indispensable.
A standard response to fish welfare problems in aquaculture is to primarily approach
this as an applied ethical question, in which ethical tools or moral guiding principles
are sought in order to reach a practical solution for welfare problems. However, this
already assumes that fish matter morally and that we know how much they matter, but
as we hope to have made clear, this is not a self-evident assumption. With the help of,
for example, the ethical matrix a leap is made to practice that in our eyes is too hasty. It
is too hasty for two reasons: firstly, it is necessary to make more fundamental
presuppositions explicit, and secondly, regarding fish our knowledge is still limited.
The applied ethical response to fish welfare problems tacitly assumes a
discussion about moral status that we think should be made explicit. We have
aimed to show that this discussion on moral status is only successful if three
questions are explicitly distinguished: first, why would fish be morally consider-
able?; second, how morally significant are fish?; and third, how should we
adjudicate in the case of a conflict of interest between fish and humans or other
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animals? The first only establishes what entities are part of the moral community,
while the second gives an answer to the question of how we should treat these
entities and the third answer the question how to weigh their interests in the case of
conflicts of interest. We have aimed to show that the first question only has limited
applicability. Moral considerability only establishes an important starting point, but
most of the work needs to be done on the significance and adjudication questions.
Neither can be answered in a theory-independent way. There does not even seem to
be one and the same moral status question that all theories ask. The answer to the
question of what entities possess moral considerability is heavily influenced by the
central conceptual choices of one’s theoretical ethical framework and the answers to
the significance and adjudication questions are dependent on one’s normative
framework. A successful discussion on moral status, then, requires that parties are
aware of their ethical and normative presuppositions. The fact that theories on moral
status are prestructured by theoretical ethical and normative frameworks ultimately
has an influence on the moral decisions that are made in practice. For example, a
question that rises in some theories, such as Regan’s animal rights theory and in
virtue ethics, but not in others, is whether we should farm fish in the first place.
Also, some theories are more open to weighing different interests, while others are
more absolutist. Especially because we encounter a knowledge gap regarding fish it
is necessary to reflect on our normative presuppositions. We encounter factual
uncertainties and the relevance of these uncertainties depends on one’s moral
principles and values. We illustrated these points with the case-study of the farming
of the African catfish, which also showed the importance of cooperation with
empirical scientists. The questions asked of empirical scientists, however, will differ
according to the different ethical approaches.
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